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Part I. Introduction
Severity and Prolonged Duration
The great, in the Great Depression, refers to the severity and prolonged duration 
of the economic downturn. The BEA reports that in 1933, the real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of the United States was $64.1 billion, compared to $87.2 billion in 
1929.1 Real GDP in the United States plunged over 25% over the course of four years. In 
industry, “not until 1937 did the physical volume of production recover to the levels of 
1929, and then it promptly slipped back again. Until 1941 the dollar value of production 
remained below 1929.”2 Furthermore, in 1932,22.89% of the civilian labor force was
unemployed, the highest recorded percentage in the economic history of the United 
States.3 John Kenneth Galbriath reports that，“in 1933 nearly thirteen million were out of 
work, or about one in every four in the labor force. In 1938 one person in five was still 
out of work.’’4 Due to the enduring and severe nature of the economic calamity that 
afflicted the United States throughout the 1930s, the Great Depression has provoked a
plethora of economic interpretations of reasons for the abnormal depth, and duration of
the economic depression.
Hypothesis
My hypothesis is that throughout the 1920s, shifts in the retained profits to labor
income ratio contributed to the depth and duration of the Great Depression. Escalating
degrees of monopoly power through decreasing levels of competition, declining union
1 Bureau of Economic Analysis. National Economic Accounts. Table 1.1.6A. Real Gross Domestic 
Product, Chained (1937) Dollars.
2 Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Great Crash 1929. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997.168.
3 Weir, David R. “Labor force, employment, and unemployment: 1890-1990.” Vol. 2. In Historical 
Statistics of the United States, Richard Sutch and Susan B. Carter, 2-82 - 2-84. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006.2-82.
4 Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Great Crash 1929. 168.
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membership, the increasing use of advertising, the transfer of labor-saving technology 
into commercial business, and urbanization enabled firms in the manufacturing sector, a 
key economic sector, to expand their profit margins and reduce labor costs. While wages 
and salaries also grew in the 1920s, the rate of growth in profits was higher than the rate 
of growth in wages and salaries. Factor income distribution, herein measured as the ratio 
of retained earnings5 of firms to labor income, increased during the 1920s due to 
increasing profits relative to wages and salaries.6 Increasing profits, coupled with future 
expectations of demand resulting from enduring consumption activity, due to the 
extension of consumer credit, catalyzed over-accumulation throughout the 1920s. Keynes 
defines “over-investment, strictly speaking，” as a situation in which, “any further 
investment would be a sheer waste of resources.”7 Over-accumulation-led economic 
growth magnified a “relatively mild...initial downturn”8 by encouraging under­
consumption and over-expanding the productive capacity of firms.
I will subsequently proceed by examining core concepts used throughout my
thesis. Then, I present a literature review of the books, articles, and journals that
influenced my perception of factor income distribution and the role of credit. Following
the literature review, I discuss the theories of other individuals who argue that a
s In the manufacturing sector, the gross profit figure is calculated by subtracting the cost of goods and cost 
of labor from the total value of all goods manufactured. For the agricultural sector, gross profit is measured 
by deducting the cost of labor and cost of materials from the value of all agricultural products. This figure 
however, does not account for depreciation, interest, rent, and other miscellaneous expenses.
6 Devine argues that the increasing availability of cheap labor due to urbanization, labor-saving technology 
and increased labor supply from the end ofWWI “encouraged high and rising profit shares and rates in 
these [non-entrepreneurial manufacturing and other] sectors.” Devine, James. “The Causes of the 1929-33 
Great Collapse: A Marxian Interpretation” in Paul Zarembaka (ed). Research in Political Economy 14 
(1994): 119-194. Keller states, “The twenties appears to be the only decade in the twentieth century where 
capital's share of income increased.” Keller, Robert. “Factor Income Distribution in the US During the 
1920s: A Reexamination of Fact and Theoiy,” Journal of Economic History 33, no. 1 (1973): 252-273.254.
7 Keynes, John M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. New York: Prometheus 
Books, 1997.321.
8 Smiley, Gene. “The U.S. Economy in the 1920s.” EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. 
March 26,2008. URL http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/Smiley. 1920s.final
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propagation mechanism, other than factor income inequality, contributed to the depth and 
duration of the Great Depression. The heart of my analysis begins by enumerating 
reasons for which factor income inequality heightened during the 1920s. I then argue that 
profits and labor incomes affect investment and consumption, respectively. A brief 
introduction regarding the method of analysis and availability of the data precedes the 
actual empirical analysis. Subsequently, the empirical results are elucidated and analyzed. 
Finally, I then discuss the manner in which income distribution affected the investment
and consumption through over-accumulation and under-consumption.
Core Concepts
The crux of my thesis is derived three main concepts: (1) factor income 
distribution, (2) under-consumption, and (3) over-accumulation. My argument seeks to 
ascertain why aggregate demand, through consumption and investment, failed to
cyclically recover after the economic downturn. Using the distribution of factor income
between laborers and profit earners within an economy, as an indicator of inequality, is
essential to my argument because of the linkage between aggregate demand and the level
of income earned by laborers and profit earners. Under-consumption and over-
accumulation, rather than competing theories, are used together, as an explanatory
mechanism for the depth and duration of the Great Depression.
(1) Factor Income Distribution & Profits
My analysis of the Great Depression utilizes factor income distribution, as 
opposed to the traditional measurement income distribution,9 because the primary
9 The traditional measurement of income distribution refers to the distribution of income between income 
brackets. Kuzents thoroughly compiled data on the distribution of income before and during the Great 
Depression and therefore is a widely recognized authority figure in this field. This type of income
Huey 6
purpose of my paper is to explain how a cyclical recession was turned into the Great
Depression through an analysis of investment and consumption. Factor income 
distribution divides the amount of income into the four segments: profit, rent, interest and
wages and salaries. The conventional use of factor income distribution then combines
profit, rent, and interest to forma measurement of property income. Wages and salaries
are labeled as labor incomes.
10(2) Under-Consumption
Proponents of the under-consumptionist argument emphasize the lethargic growth
of consumption relative to the growth of investment during an economic expansion due
to a disproportionate share of income between capitalists and laborers. Capitalists are
assumed to receive property income, rents, interest, and profits, whereas laborers receive
wages and salaries. Increasing income during an expansion leads to increasing
consumption, which ultimately stimulates an increase in aggregate demand. Increasing
demand, through the accelerator mechanism, encourages firm investment. Growing
investment from firms induces higher employment and higher incomes. Through the
multiplier mechanism, rising employment and incomes increase consumption. Escalating 
consumption activity is translated into increasing aggregate demand and then, once again, 
increasing incomes. The bifurcation of income into property income and labor income is 
the fundamental element of the under-consumptionist argument. While the level of
income is increasing during an expansion, property incomes increase at a faster rate than
real wages. Property incomes increase faster than labor incomes because of the delayed,
distribution fails to differentiate between those who engage in investment expenditures and those who 
consume.
Sherman, Howard J. The Business Cycle: Growth and Crisis under Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991.202 - 204.
10
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but gradual adjustment of the wage level and because capitalists acquire gains from 
increases in productivity in conjunction with sluggish increases in labor incomes. “[I]n 
the average expansion real wages rise more slowly than do real profits, so the [aggregate] 
marginal propensity to consume [for the economy] falls.”11 Under-consumptionists then 
assert that because capitalists have a lower MPC than laborers, consumption expenditures 
increase at a declining rate. A decreasing rate of increase in consumption contributes to a 
decline in aggregate demand and therefore, a decrease in investment. Diminishing 
investment subsequently reduces the level of income and employment. Economic 
recovery is instigated by the progressive increase in labor’s share because the rate of 
change in property incomes is less than the rate of change in labor incomes. During an
expansion, property incomes increased at a greater rate than labor incomes;
symmetrically, during a recession，property incomes decrease at a greater rate than labor
incomes. Eventually, as labor income’s share of national income increases there is an
increase in the MPC. An increasing MPC leads to increasing consumption leading to an
increase in aggregate demand, and then a successive increase in investment. Essentially,
consumption is not oiily a function of income, but a fimction of the distribution of income
between capitalists and laborers.
12(3) Over-Accumulation
Advocates of the over-accumulation theory perceive investment, as a function of 
the rate of profit and cost of capital, as the driving force behind expansions, recessions, 
and recoveries. An increasing profit rate from higher levels of demand in an expansion 
leads to increasing investment. As investment increases, firms have higher productive
u Ibid. 203.
Ibid. 222-223.12
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capacities which in turn contribute to higher potential output. As the supply of output 
increases, the price of output declines, ceteris paribus. Increasing demand for capital, to 
finance investment, leads to an increase in the price of capital. The ratio of the price of 
output to the price of capital subsequently declines; the decline in the price of output 
therefore, necessarily leads to a total decrease in revenue from output. Furthermore, 
investment is a function of the rate of profit and the cost of capital, a declining rate of 
profit due to decreasing revenues from output, coupled with a higher cost of capital from 
the previously increasing demand for capital, generates a reduction in investment.
as
Investment is directly related to the profit rate whereas investment is inversely related to
the cost of capital. Declining investment reduces the future aggregate productive capacity
of firms and therefore consequently decreases their future potential output. If demand
remains constant, a decrease in the supply of output leads to an increase in the price of
output. The price of capital declines because firms are reducing their level of investment
and this, therefore, leads to an increase in the ratio of the price of output to the price of
capital. The progressive increase in the rate of profit increases investment, ultimately
leading to an increase in output and employment.
Modifying and Using Core Concepts
I slightly altered each of these concepts in order to utilize them in my thesis. For
the purposes of this paper, I disaggregate property income and focus on the amount of
income retained by firms. Herein, we accept that the measurement of factor income
distribution is a measurement of the distribution of income between laborers and firms.
Intuitively then, distributional shifts in factor incomes, rather than shifts in income
deciles, are more likely to reflect changes in the level of consumption and investment.
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My explanation of the Great Depression is derived from a fusion of both an under-
consumptionist and over-accumulationist perspective. From the under-consumptionist 
perspective, I modify the distribution of factor income by substituting property income 
with firm remuneration (retained corporate profits). Also, instead of examining the 
different MPC of each factor, I trace changing levels of investment and consumption
back to shifts in labor incomes and profits. Furthermore, I introduce credit as an auxiliary
dement in explaining the changing level of consumption as consumption is a function of 
the interest rate through credit financing. From the over-accumulation theory, I
incorporate the rate of profit from output and the productive capacity of firms as elements
that contribute to the level of investment activity. My argument interweaves aspects of
both demand-side under-consumption and supply-side over-accumulation.
Investment is also a function of the interest rate, but that is not the primary focus of the use of credit in 
this paper.
13
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Part II. Literature Review
In this component of my thesis I discuss the various authors and economic
perspectives that have influenced my vision of the Great Depression. The Monetarist, 
Financialist, Structuralist, Marxist, and Keynesian perspectives are represented by 
authority figures on the Great Depression from their respective theories. Robert Keller is 
also discussed as his work shaped my views on factor income distribution.
Monetarist (Friedman and Schwartz)
The Monetarist perspective argues that the conversion of a recession into the
extraordinary depth and duration of the Great Depression was due to a myriad of 
contradictory fiscal and monetary policies implemented by the U.S. government and 
Federal Reserve.14 Monetarists assert that the Federal Reserve should have employed
expansionary monetary policy when an economic recovery was first signaled by
economic indicators. The explanatory strength of the Monetarist argument rests in the
corresponding timing between the various factors that influenced the money supply and
the contradictory policies of the Federal Reserve.
Monetarists, similarly to my argument, address the depth and duration of the
Great Depression rather than the causes of it. The Monetarist perspective complements
my argument as their perspective influenced the role of credit in my argument. The
Federal Reserve’s control over the money supply, through the interest rate, affects the
level of aggregate demand. The availability of credit, a function of the interest rate,
affects the level of consumption and investment; therefore, I use it as a supplementary
14 Friedman, Milton, and A. Schwartz. A Modern History of the US. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963.
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component to the level of income distribution to explain how 汪 cyclical recession was 
magnified into the Great Depression.
The fundamental weakness with the Monetarist perspective is that the 
contradictory monetary policies implemented by the Federal Reserve fail to address the 
firm’s incentives for investment. My argument not only accounts for the ability of 
investment, but also incentives for investment activity. Over-accumulation in the 1920s
exacerbated declining incentives for firms to invest. I will show that the productive 
capacity of firms by 1929 far surpassed the demand capability of consumers as the high
level of income disparity and the contraction of credit worked together to restrict demand.
Persistent low levels of demand created vast degrees of unused capacity and therefore
firms lacked investment incentives. New investment would not have been met by
adequate levels of demand from consumers to compel firms to increase their productive
capacity.
Financialist (Bernanke)
The Financialist perspective, as represented by Ben Bemanke, asserts that the
failure of financial institutions as a reliable financial intermediary between borrowers and
lenders, and overall disruptions in the credit markets allowed the recession to escalate
into the Great Depression. Factors such as widespread bank runs, massive bank failures,
and a low confidence in banks to act as financial intermediaries, contributed to increasing 
the costs of credit intermediation and credit rationing.15 As the cost of credit
15 The costs of credit intermediation (CCI) consist of the expenses that financial intermediaries incur while 
functioning as a mediating body between net borrowers and net lenders. The absence of commensurate 
knowledge possessed by net borrowers and net lenders necessitates the presence of financial institutions to 
assess the credibility of potential borrowers for those who possess inferior knowledge of capital markets, 
lenders. Changing costs of credit intermediation affect the economy through the amount of credit available 
to potential borrowers. Financial intermediaries control the amount of loanable funds by adjusting their 
reserves, their assessment of a good borrower, and their interest rate. Bernanke, Ben. "Nonmonetary
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intermediation increased, previously credit-worthy net borrowers were precluded from 
accessing loanable funds. This occurs either through high interest rates or the withholding 
of loanable funds by financial intermediaries.16 The primary reason for the magnitude of 
the Great Depression is attributed to the increasing propensity for households and firms 
to use credit as a means to finance expenditures in the 1920s. The prolonged duration of 
the Great Depression is a result of an inability to restore confidence in banks to act as 
reliable intermediaries, and in net borrowers to repay their debt obligations.
The Financialists and I emphasize the increasingly important role of credit as a 
vehicle for financing expenditures in the 1920s as a mechanism for converting a cyclical
downturn into a depression. As a larger segment of the population began using credit to
purchase consumer expenditures, the contraction of credit, through the higher CCI,
adversely influenced the expenditures of a more extensive portion of the population.
Similarly to the Financialists, I argue that a reduction in consumption demand, partially
due to the tightening of credit, contributed to the prolonged duration and severity of the
Great Depression.
Structuralist (Bernstein)
The Structuralists argue that the secular changes, shifting the structure of our
economy, working with cyclical mechanisms were the primary contributors to the depth
and duration of the Great Depression. The changing composition of the manufacturing 
sector precluded an economic recovery after the cyclical downturn. “The lack of recovery
in the American economy of the 1930s did not result from every manufacturing sector
Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression." American Economic Review 7, 
no. 3 (1983): 257-276.
Bemanke notes that financial intermediaries during the Great Depression were more inclined to use the 
latter tool and this therefore restricted with availability of credit.
16
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being depressed. It was a combination of growth rates of the industries composing the 
national economy that yielded a net result of virtually no growth.”17 Changes in consumer 
demand expenditures stimulated demand in non-capital-intensive industries. Capital- 
intensive industries were not encouraged to invest because of a shift in demand by 
consumer expenditures away from output produced by capital-intensive industries. 
Aggregate investment demand subsequently declined due to a waning demand for output 
from capital-intensive industries. “Sectors [non-capital-intensive] where net investment 
recovered relatively quickly after the trough of 1932 had low shares of national 
employment and national value-product. Conversely, those industries that in the interwar
period accounted for large shares of employment and output engage in little expansion in 
the immediate wake of the crash.” Essentially, consumption activity as constrained by
high unemployment in capital-intensive industries that encompassed a large percentage of
national employment. Economic recovery in the 1930s was stifled as investment activity
was impeded by low consumption activity.
Bernstein’s argument is interesting because he delves deeper into the structure of
the manufacturing industry. His argument is compelling and allowed me to develop an
initial perspective of the Great Depression. His concept of secular changes affecting the
macroeconomy through instability influenced my line of reasoning. Similar to my
analysis of the Great Depression, Bernstein suggests that events that transpired in the
1920s created an unstable economic framework. Furthermore, we agree that the unstable
foundation laid the groundwork for the depth and duration of the Great Depression, but
did not cause it.
17 Bernstein, Michal A. The Great Depression: Delayed recoveiy and economic change in America, 1929- 
1939. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987. 50.
18 Ibid. 32.
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Marxist (Devine)
Through a Marxian perspective, Devine views the Great Depression in the context 
of its depth and duration rather than its causes. His labor abundance and increasing profit 
rate argument of the 1920s explains how shifts in the remuneration to capital rather than 
to labor created an unstable economic framework. “U.S. prosperity was fragile 
before late 1929, due to the process of over-investment relative to demand.’’19 An 
increasing labor supply after WWI depressed labor incomes and an increasing rate of 
profit from technological change worked together to produce an increasing profit rate and 
stagnant labor incomes. The unstable structure of the economy was then “collapsed” by 
triggers55 which initiated the Great Depression.
Devine’s argument accurately addresses both supply-side and demand-side 
conditions of the economy before the Great Depression therefore allowing him to explain 
the abnormal depth and duration of the Great Depression. The interaction of over- 
accumulation and under-consumption is similar to my argument; however, I add to his 
argument by using Pearson correlations to empirically analyze the profit-investment and 
labor income-consumption relationships.
even
5
)
21
Keynesian (Romer)
The Keynesian argument, from the perspective of Romer, addresses the causes, 
depth, and duration of the Great Depression. The initial cause of the recession was due to 
the stock market crash in October of 1929. The stock market crash decreased household
Devine, James. “The Causes of the 1929-33 Great Collapse: A Marxian Interpretation” in Paul 
Zarembaka (ed). 166.
My analysis of the Great Depression differs from Devine because I examine income retained by 
corporations, not a profit rate. Devine’s profit rate encompasses all profit incomes which are inclusive of 
dividend and interest payments.
Devine attributes the stock market crash, and contractionary fiscal and monetary policy as the triggers of 
the Great Depression.
19
20
21
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wealth and increased uncertainty about the future. Romer differentiates between
uncertainty and pessimism because the former helps explain the recession, but the latter is 
associated with the depth and extended duration of the Great Depression. On the firm 
side, increased uncertainly affected businesses by decreasing the level of investment. On 
the consumer side, decreasing wealth, coupled with increased uncertainty stemming from 
the stock market crash, reduced the level of consumption for durable goods. Romer states 
that, C6this effect [the decrease in consumer durables] is seen most clearly in the fact that 
department store sales and automobile registrations declined precipitously in November
»22and December 1929, while grocery store sales and ten-cent store sales actually rose.
Romer then attributes banking panics, causing “9000 banks to suspend 
operations,” as the primary contributor to the severe and prolonged nature of the Great
Depression. As banks failures and bank suspensions interrupted the flow of credit, this
ultimately resulted in a reduction of the money supply, an increase in the interest rate,
and a subsequent decrease in investment. The decrease in aggregate demand from
declining investment was further compounded by a reduction in consumption as
24pessimism replaced consumer and investor uncertainty due to the banking panics.
Romer complements my analysis of the Great Depression through her use of a
demand-side perspective, the financialist explanatory elements, and the role of
expectations. The role of banking panics and bank failures throughout the early 1930s as
a contributing factor to sustaining a recession is analogous to my perspective of the role
of the failure of financial institutions. Problems with the banking industry ultimately
Romer, Christina. “The Nation in Depression.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 2 (1993): 19-39.
31.
Ibid. 32. 
Ibid. 32.
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reduced investment through depressing future expectations and increasing the interest 
rate. The effect of the banking problems on expectations is less emphasized in my essay 
than the effect on the interest rate. Romer’s argument parallels my argument as we both 
emphasize the role of expectations of future business conditions. Future expectations, 
arising from the level demand, in both Romer’s and my argument, are an important 
influence on the level of investment. Romer and I also utilize a demand-side perspective 
to examine the factors that influenced the Great Depression.
Romer’s demand-side analysis however, fails to address the Great Depression in
the context of supply-side economics. My argument, through business cycle over-
accumulation and under-consumption examines the Great Depression using both supply-
side and demand-side economic theories.
Robert Keller
Keller asserts his contention with the methods that have been used by other
economists’ use the distribution of factor incomes. His goal in “Factor Income
Distribution in the US During the 1920s: A Reexamination of Fact and Theory” is to
rectify the deficiencies in other economists，use of factor incomes. For Keller, the
measurement of factor incomes omits both entrepreneurial income and rental income.
Both entrepreneurial income and rental income “contain returns to a number of inputs- 
land, labor, and capital[;] this amalgamation of various returns makes it extremely
^\c
difficult to associate a factor income payment with its respective input.” These two
forms of income are difficult to trace directly back to either capitalists or laborers and
therefore are excluded from his analysis. Using data from Kuznets, Keller shows that
25 Keller, Robert. “Factor Income Distribution in the US During the 1920s: A Reexamination of Fact and 
Theory.” 255•
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there was a shift in the distribution of factor incomes in favor of capital’s share during the 
1920s. Furthermore, in comparable periods, he asserts that the 1920s was unusual 
because it was the only time in which there was a shift in the distribution toward capital’s 
share. Keller then proceeds by providing evidence and arguments for greater degrees of 
monopoly power, increased fuel input efficiency, technological change, and the
expansion of capital intensive industries as causal mechanisms for the shift in factor
incomes.
Keller’s article is complementary to my argument as I use some of the same
elements in the 1920s to explain the shift it the ratio between retained profits and labor
incomes. However, Keller’s article failed to explain how a shift in factor incomes could
contribute to the Great Depression. While this may not be the main focus of his article,
his article helped me formulate my initial ideas about factor income distribution and a
shift in factor income distribution could influence changes in the level of consumption 
and investment. Keller briefly asserts that “the shift in the distribution... created an 
imbalance between investment and consumption. Keller merely leaves a footnote
listing various authors who have attempted to explain the Great Depression through an
under-consumptionist perspective. My argument fine-tunes and expands on Keller’s
argument by using empirical evidence to show how shifts in the ratio of retained profits
to labor incomes affect investment and consumption.
26 Ibid. 252.
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Part III. The Industrial Structure and Influences on Factor Income Distribution
Growth in the 1920s
Even though data from the national economy will serve as the primary reference 
for subsequent empirical analyses, the manufacturing industry is vital to an analysis of 
the economy during the 1920s. Devine notes that as a whole，from 1907 to 1929, “while 
the relative claims on national income in the agricultural and non-farm entrepreneurial 
(i.e.，proprietorship, small business) sectors were shrinking, those of non-entrepreneurial 
(corporate) manufacturing and "other5 were growing steadily.’’27 Fabricant concedes that
even though the manufacturing sector’s employment of the national labor supply did not
increase, “the aggregate physical output of manufacturing industries increased more
rapidly than the net national product not only up to 1919, but thereafter as well. From
1899 to 1919 the physical output of manufacturing industries rose about 20 percent more
rapidly than the net national product, and from 1919 to 1937 it went up some 35 percent 
more rapidly.’’28 Furthermore, from 1919 — 1938, the manufacturing sector contributed an
annual average of just under $14 billion to national income, encompassing 21,1% of
OOnational income. “In terms of employment, two of the selected industries,
manufacturing and agriculture, are the most important sectors of our economy. Measured 
by contribution to national income, manufacturing is first...”3。Bernstein, Fabricant, 
Devine, Keller, and Soule all focus on the manufacturing sector because of its economic
importance; therefore, this paper, similarly, focuses on the manufacturing sector.
27 Devine, James. “The Causes of the 1929-33 Great Collapse: A Marxian Interpretation** in Paul 
Zarembaka (ed). 141.
Fabricant, Solomon. The Output of Manufacturing Industries, 1899 - 1937. New York: NBER Inc” 1940.28
4-5.
29 Fabricant, Solomon. Labor Savings in American Industry 1899 -1939. New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1945.27.
Ibid. 27.30
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Theories behind the shifting composition of income distribution, intertwined with 
supporting evidence from the 1920s, demonstrate that factor income inequality increased
during the 1920s.
Influences on the Distribution of Factor Incomes
In the manufacturing sector, the coalesced effects of increasing market power, the 
frequent use of advertising, a reduction in union power, the greater degree of 
implementation of labor-saving technology, and urbanization increased the ratio of 
profits to labor incomes. In oligopolistic industries, oligopolies can influence the price 
level by dissuading price competition through price leadership, collusion, and tacit 
agreements. Oligopolies can effectively set the price of goods with the consent and
more
reciprocation of other firms providing substitutes. If firms conspire to set the price of a
good and other firms affirm the set price by pricing their substitutable products at the
same price level, oligopolies benefit from a larger markup. “So long as all firms accept
this convention [the set price] - and it is really nothing but a corollary of the ban on price 
competition - it becomes relatively easy for the group as a whole to feel its way toward 
the price which maximizes the industry’s profit.’’31 However，if a firm chooses to engage
in price competition by lowering the price below the price floor, as set by the price
leader, the oligopoly’s pricing strategy fails. The degree of competition within an
industry affects a firms，ability to secure larger profits. In a competitive industry, “[t]he
firm must make sure that the price does not become too high in relation to the prices of 
other firms, for this would drastically reduce sales.’’32 Businesses operating in industries
31 Baran, Paul A. and Paul M. Sweezy. Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social 
Order. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966.61.
32 Kalecki, Michal. Theory of Economic Dyna 
Capitalist Economy. New York: Augustus M.
mics: An Essay on Cyclical and Long-Run Changes in 
Kelley Publishers, 1969. 12.
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with inadequate levels of competition however, have greater degrees of price control 
because these industries lack firms that will engage in price-cutting behavior. 
“[I]ncreased industrial concentration increases the degree of monopoly because a large 
firm knows that its price 尸 influences appreciably the average price level P* and thereby 
the pricing behaviour of other firms. Thus, the firm can fix its price level at a higher level 
than would otherwise be the case.”33 Greater degrees of price control can allow firms to
advantageously improve their mark-up price.
An increasing propensity for firms to merge and therefore mitigate competition in
the 1920s enabled firms to retain greater profits as increasing industrial concentration
fosters an environment of tacit collusion and non-price competition. “Multifirm
consolidations, the hallmark of the first merger movement [1903-1920], were far less 
common in the 1920s; merger via acquisition became the dominant form of 
combination.’’34 “It was estimated that by the end of 1929 the two hundred largest
business corporations possessed nearly half of the corporate wealth in the country, 38 per 
cent of the business wealth, and 20 per cent of the total national wealth.”35 The
imperfectly competitive nature of the 1920s US capitalist economy, due to the extent of
mergers, created oligopolistic opportunities that afforded firms greater degrees of market 
power. The manufacturing sector as a whole lost almost 80,000 establishments from 1919 
to 1923.36 The number of establishments remained low throughout the 1930s as well.
33 Jarsulic, Marc. Effective Demand and Income Distribution. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.105.
DuBofT, Richard. Accumulation and Power: An Economic History of the United States. Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1989.79.
Soule, George, 1947, “Industry, Business, Finance,” Ch.7, in The Prosperity Decade. M.E. Sharpe. 142. 
Atack, Jeremy and Fred Bateman. “Manufacturing summary - establishments, persons engage, payroll, 
value added, capital expenditures, and inventories: 1849 - 1995.** Vol. 4. In Historical Statistics of the 
United States, Richard Sutch and Susan B. Carter, 4-579-4-581. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006.4-579.
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Lacking competition, firms in the manufacturing sector had greater leverage over the 
price level, thereby contributing to an expansion of profits.
TABLE 1
Number of Establishments in Manufacturing
1919 270,231
1921 192,059
1923 192,096
1925 183,877
1927 187,629
1929 206,663
Source: Atack, Jeremy, and Fred Bateman. “Manufacturing 
summary-establishments, persons engaged, payroll, value added, 
capital expenditures, and inventories: 1849 • 1995.,? Vol. 4. In 
Historical Statistics of the United States, Richard Sutch and Susan 
B. Carter, 4-579. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Through the medium of advertising, firms abstaining from price competition
remained able to differentiate their products from their competitors. From a free-market
theory perspective, if a firm prices its good higher than the industry average, then other
firms, attempting to gain more market share, will decrease their price or keep the price of
their similar good constant. Consumers will be able to get a similar good for a cheaper
price. Consumer switching behavior prevents firms from overpricing their products;
however, an increasing degree of industrial concentration, in conjunction with an
increasing level of advertising, seriously impairs this free-market theory. “The second
major influence [on profits] is the development of sales promotion through advertising，
selling agents, etc. Thus, price competition is replaced by competition in advertising 
campaigns, etc.”37 As a form of non-price competition, advertising enables firms to
differentiate their final product based on brand imaging rather than price. Advertising
allows firms, in oligopolistic industries, an even greater degree of market power because
37 Kalecki, Michal. Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy 1933-1970. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1971.50.
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it enhances the firms control over the consumer’s perception of a product. Firms 
adjust prices based on consumer perception of a good rather than the price of the actual 
inputs used to produce a good.
can
The development and implementation of advertising throughout the 1920s further 
contributed to rises in the degree of monopoly power thereby enhancing the ability of 
firms in oligopolistic industries to acquire greater profits. “In the general prosperity of the 
late 1920s, American advertising had flourished as never before. Few agency executives 
or trade journal editors had been too modest to credit advertising with the prime 
responsibility for the business boom.’’38Advertising acted as a stimulus for consumer
demand; firms responded to increasing demand with an increase in production. Higher
production allowed firms to distribute fixed costs between more units of production.
Advertising would increase demand, enabling the firm to increase production and
exploit (presumed) economies of scale, thereby lowering the unit cost of production and
”39permitting the firm to lower the price of the product without lowering profit.
Allocating fixed costs across more units enabled firms to lower the per unit fixed cost of
a given quantity of output. Decreasing per units fixed costs afforded firms with the ability
to decrease the price of the product, but maintain commensurate profit margins.
Declining union membership hindered laborers，bargaining power and therefore 
wages and salaries stagnated relative to profits in the 1920s.40 “It is the willingness of a
38 Marchand, Ronald. Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920-1940. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.285.
Olney, Martha L. Buy Nowt Pay Later: Advertising, Credit, and Consumer Durables in the 1920s.
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991.169.
From 1919 to 1929, using 1860 as a base year, an index for money wages for unskilled labor shows an 
increase from 409 to only 431. This is a much smaller increase compared to the increase from 166 in 1909 
to 409 in 1919. This data was retrieved from Margo A” Robert. “Index of money wages for unskilled labor: 
1774-1974•” Vol. 2. In Historical Statistics of the United States, Richard Sutch and Susan B. Carter, 2-256, 
2-257. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.2-257.
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particular trade union to press its claim to this ‘fair’ share of the incremental surplus 
value steadfastly and determinedly, even to the point of undergoing a long and costly 
strike，that enables it to enter the lists as labor’s champion〆1 The firm and the union, on 
diametrically opposite sides of the bargaining table, vie for a greater portion of the 
available added value. The firm’s primary bargaining tool to compel labor to abstain from 
obtaining a larger share of the added value is its ability to lay off its employees. An 
employee, by oneself, has a limited ability to affect the operations of a firm by abstaining 
from working and threatening to strike because a single employee is easily replaceable. 
However, if a major segment of a firm’s labor force is represented by a well organized
union, then the employees have greater power to demand more of the surplus value.
“Unions certainly do play an important role in the determination of money wages, and the
workers in more strongly organized industries generally do better for themselves than 
workers in less strongly organized branches of the economy.”42 It is more difficult for a
firm to replace a substantial amount of its workforce than to discard a few employees.
A smaller segment of the labor force registered as members in trade unions
throughout the 1920s signified a deterioration of the unions5 ability to negotiate for a
larger portion of the surplus value. “The unionization rate peaked in 1920 and fell steeply 
after that, reversing all gains after 1916.,j43 Table 2 shows that there was a decline in total
union membership from all industries by 16.53%. The largest losses in union membership
occurred in the metals, machinery, and shipbuilding industry; union membership
41 Eichner, Alfred S. The Megacorp & Oligopoly: Micro Foundations of Macro Dynamics. New York:
M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1980.183.
Baran, Paul A. and Paul M. Sweezy. Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social 
Order. 77.
Devine, James. “The Causes of the 1929-33 Great Collapse: A Marxian Interpretation** in Paul 
Zarembaka (ed).143.
42
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decreased from 618,000 in 1919 to 211,000 by 1929 in the metals, machinery, and
shipbuilding industry. Unions in the textiles, leather and shoes, clothing, and food, liquor 
and tobacco industries all experienced similar reductions in their number of members 
from 1919 to 1929. The relapse of union power hindered the ability of laborers to acquire 
additional compensation for the increasing added value, in the form of wages and 
salaries, thereby curbing labors’ share. Furthermore, “the organizational frailty of 
unions... create[d] a situation of ‘labor abundance’ for leading sectors.5944 Increasing the 
supply of labor, without complementary increases in the demand for labor, leads to 
decreases in the price of labor in a perfectly competitive market.
Table 2
Union Membership In Selected Industries, from 1919 一 1929 (in Thousands)
Metals,
machinery, Leather
and and Food, liquor, 
and tobaccoTotal shipbuilding Textiles Shoes Clothing
1919 4,125 618 60 104 324 168
1920 5,048 859 149 113 374 181
1921 4,781 728 88 96 323 146
1922 4,027 506 37 90 310 99
1923 3,622 56257 37 295 76
1924 3,536 218 38 47 282 76
3,5191925 205 36 54 292 75
1926 3,502 202 36 55 292 75
1927 3,546 204 35 49 267 70
1928 3,480 205 35 45 239 66
1929 3,443 211 35 47 218 65
% Change 
from
1919-1929 16.53% 65.86% 41.67% 54.81% 32.72% 61.31%
Source: Rosenbloom，Joshua L. “Union membership, by industry: 1897-1934.” Vol. 2. In 
Historical Statistics of the United States, Richard Sutch and Susan B. Carter, 2-343 - 2-344. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press，2006.__________________________________
Ibid. 144.
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The fourth element responsible for the rising profit to labor income ratio is the 
increasing implementation of labor-saving technology. Technological gains and the 
pervasive substitution of electricity for manpower in the 1920s increased the productive 
capacity of firms, depressed wages and salaries, and increased profits. “The 
mechanization of American manufacturing accelerated in the 1920s, and this led to a
much more rapid growth of productivity in manufacturing compared to earlier decades 
and to other sectors at that time.’*45 The percentage increase in person-hour productivity
from 1914 to 1927 was 292%, 178%, and 82% for rubber tires, automobiles, and 
petroleum refining, respectively.46 Other sectors, such as iron and steel, cement, and flour
milling also experienced sizable gains in productivity. Jerome also reports considerable
increases in the horsepower per wage earner from 1919 to 1929; the horsepower per wage
earner almost doubled from 1919 to 1929 in the tobacco manufactures, vehicles, rubber 
products, and chemicals and allied products industries. Overall, the manufacturing
sector reported substantial advances in the efficiency of labor, thereby facilitating vast
increases in the productive capacity of firms.
The cost-saving benefits of technological improvements were intensified by the
pervasive implementation of electrification in the manufacturing industry in the 1920s. 
“By 1929 about 70 percent of manufacturing activity relied on electricity, compared to
AO
roughly 30 percent in 1914. The commercialization of electricity in the manufacturing
industry propagated gains in labor efficiency across industries. “Electric-driven
technology。for example,] mechanized most of the two or three dozen hand processes in
45 Smiley, Gene. “The U.S. Economy in the 1920s.”
Bernstein, Michal A. The Great Depression: Delayed recovery and economic change in America, 1929- 
1939.135.
47 Jerome, Harry. Mechanization in Industry. New York: NBER, 1934.257.
Smiley, Gene. “The U.S. Economy in the 1920s.”
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the factory and tended to remove unskilled laborers from the factory floor, while the 
existing machines, modified and converted to electric drive, became more efficient as 
their speed, power, and accuracy improved.’沿 Supplanting unskilled labor with 
electricity minimized the labor costs of firms, but also consequently limited the level of
aggregate wages and salaries.
The realization of labor-saving technological improvements in the 1920s lowered 
labor costs thereby increasing the profits of firms. “Technical change reduced the amount 
of inputs needed to produce a given level of output and thereby reduced the costs of 
producing output. The existence of monopoly power would limit the reduction of output 
prices and therefore increase profits.”50 Firms could produce commensurate levels of
output while reducing their employed labor force. Decreasing labor costs, in conjunction
with oligopolistic pricing strategies, enabled firms to realize growing profits.
Urbanization in the United States, during the 1920s, shifted the economic
importance of the agricultural sector to the manufacturing sector, and also depressed
wages and salaries. “In 1880, only 3.4 percent of the population lived in cities over a 
million. This percentage peaked in 1930 at 13.3 percent[.],,sl In the decade of the 1920s 
there was a population shift from farms to cities; “the 17,688,000 nonfarm householders
in the United States in 1920 grew to 23,266,000 by 1930; whereas farm families, 
numbering 6,790,000 in 1920, dropped to 6,729,000.”52 The movement from farms to
4 Oshima, Harry T. "The Growth ofU.S. Factor Productivity: The Significance of New Technologies in 
the Early Decades of the Twentieth Century." The Journal of Economic History 44, no. 1 (1984). JSTOR. 
(8 March 2009). 164.
50 Keller, Robert R. “Factor Income Distribution in the United States During the 1920*s: A Reexamination 
of Fact and Theory.” 266.
Monkkonen, Eric H. America Becomes Urban: The Development of U.S. Cities & Towns 1780 -1980. 
Berkeley: The Regents of the University of California, 1988.70.
52 Green, Constance McLaughlin. The Rise of Urban America. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
1965. 139.
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cities shifted the importance of available employment in the agricultural sector to the 
manufacturing sector. From between 1922 to 1929, the manufacturing sector employed 
about 1.5 million more laborers, whereas farm sector employment decline by 20,000 
workers.53 Bernstein also reports that in 1919, the agricultural labor force was 28.6%
54compared to 22.1% in 1929.
While employment in the manufacturing sector absorbed laborers migrating from 
rural farms to metropolitan cities, the migration negatively impacted wages and salaries 
for laborers. “[T]he undiminished supply of industrial labor... left wage earners
”55 The increase in the supply of labor within cities pushed down the price ofinsecure.
labor and therefore constricted wages and salaries in manufacturing. While real wages
and salaries did rise in the 1920s, urbanization, labor-saving technology, diminishing
unions, advertising, and increased market power all contributed to real profits increasing
at a faster rate than real wages and salaries; real corporate retained income increased by
5659.15% whereas real labor incomes only increased by 20.55%.
Role of Durable Goods and Consumer Credit
At this point in this essay, it has been argued that labor incomes in a key
economic sector, the manufacturing sector, have grown at a slower rate than profits. This
runs contrary to consumption expenditures during the 1920s. The important role of
consumer credit as a vehicle for individuals to consume beyond one’s means can explain
53 Sutch, Ricard. “Employees on nonagricultural payrolls, by industry: 1900- 1940.” Vol. 2. In Historical 
Statistics of the United States, Richard Sutch and Susan B. Carter, 2-111. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006.2-111.
Bernstein, Michal A. The Great Depression: Delayed recovery and economic change in America, 1929- 
1939.150.
Green, Constance McLaughlin. The Rise of Urban America. 139.
Nominal income retained by corporations and nominal labor incomes were retrieved from Bums Twenty- 
Sixth Annual Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Using a constructed 1929 price 
deflator, the nominal dollars were converted into 1929 dollars.
54
55
56
Huey 28
this intuitive contradiction. Consumer credit, extended to consumers in the 1920s to 
purchase durable goods accounts for the persistent increases in consumption 
expenditures. The 1920s marked a dramatic increase in the expansion of credit 
availability to consumers. “[I]n the six years after 1922, loans and investments held by 
banks had increased [by] over [$]18 billion[，]." [representing an] over 45 percent 
[increase] .,,57 The widespread availability of credit enabled households to more easily 
access credit to finance their purchase of consumer durables. Due to the lifespan and the 
expensive nature of durable goods such as automobiles, wagons, tires, household
appliances, furniture, and jewelry, consumer credit was used to finance their purchases.
Credit extended the consumption of durable goods to less wealthy consumers by allowing
them to pay for expensive durable goods in stages, over time, rather than with an upfront
lump sum payment. Even though credit was used to finance the purchase of goods before
58the 1920s, the degree to which it was used by consumers was unprecedented.
[C]onsumer credit，a device not unknown before the war, but one which has been used
individually, informally, and with rather rigid discrimination based upon the purpose of
”59the loan.
The pervasive use of consumer credit throughout the 1920s supplemented
growing real labor incomes and therefore augmented consumption financed by wages and
salaries. “Real wages and salaries had been relatively constant from 1900 to 1915, and
much of the wartime increase had been wiped away by the price inflation of 1919 - 1920
57 Persons, C.E. “Credit Expansion, 1920 to 1929, and its Lesson,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 45 
(1930):94-130.96.
58 Outstanding co
recorded year approaches this number. See appendices for more information. Olney, Martha L. Buy Now, 
Pay Later: Advertising, Credit, and Consumer Durables in the 1920s. 88.
Mowry, George E. The Urban Nation: 1920- 1960. New York: First American Century Series, 1968.6.
nsumer debt by 1929 peaked at just over $24 billion real 1982 dollars. No previously
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and the depression of 1921. Either wages had to be raised or some other means found to 
increase mass consuming power. One of the answers was consumer credit[.],,6° The 
widespread use of credit in the 1920s can therefore account for the difference between
rising consumption activity and sluggish growth in labor income. “Cash purchase of 
many major durable goods commanded a large share of the average household’s 
disposable income.’’61 Without credit, consumers, across income groups, would have 
been unable to increase their purchase of durable goods and therefore the growing sector 
of consumption expenditures would have been stifled. Increasing consumption, through 
the use of credit, reinforced the expectations of rising demand even though growth in 
labor income was relatively small.
Growing factor income inequality, favoring the profits of firms, altered the
composition of national expenditures in the 1920s. As a measure of the composition of
consumption and investment expenditures, Keller calculates the ratio of nominal
consumption to investment. The C/I ratio decreases from 1919 to 1929 by 1.98,
62suggesting that investment expenditures increased throughout this time period.
over-investment process is akin to a “bubble” in financial markets: the economy is
growing because of faith that the economy will continue to grow, while profitability is 
maintained because high profit rates encourage investment.’’63 The microeconomic 
changes in the income distribution, reflecting shifting proportions favoring firm profits
60 Mowry, George E. The Urban Nation: 1920- 1960.6-7.
Olney, Martha L. Buy Now, Pay Later: Advertising, Credit, and Consumer Durables in the 1920s. 95. 
Keller, Robert R_ “Monopoly Capital and the Great Depression: Testing Baran and Sweezy’s 
Hypothesis.** 72.
Devine, James. “The Causes of the 1929-33 Great Collapse: A Marxian Interpretation** in Paul 
Zarembaka (ed). 160.
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over labor incomes, stimulated short-term economic growth, but retarded long-term 
economic prosperity.
Profit expectations, coupled with the credit-led demand signaled firms to increase 
productive capacity, thereby stimulating business investment. “By 1929…total 
credit, it has been estimated, had reached a peak of about $7 billion.’’64 Spending on 
major consumer durable goods purchased per household，per year, increased from $43.22 
to $184.49 between 1898 - 1916, and 1922 -1929, respectively.65 The composition of 
total consumption expenditures also showed marked changes between 1898 - 1916 and
consumer
1922 - 1929. Major durable goods showed the largest increase as a percentage of total
consumption expenditures; from 3.9% in the 1869-1897 time period to 7.6% in the 1922-
1929 time period, major durable goods as a share of total consumption expenditures 
increased by 3.7%.66 The increase in household purchases of major consumer durable
goods，through the use of credit, compelled firms to increase their productive capacity
due to expectations of future demand.
The contribution of durable goods to the overall rise in consumption expenditures
increased throughout the 1920s. “Real wages and salaries had been relatively constant
from 1900 to 1915, and much of the wartime increase had been wiped away by the price
inflation of 1919 - 1920 and the depression of 1921. Either wages had to be raised, or
some other means found to increase mass consuming power. One of the answers was
卿]，567 “By 1929. •. total consumer credit, it has been estimated, hadconsumer ere
64 Mowry, George E. The Urban Nation: 1920- I960.6-7.
Olney, Martha L. Buy Now, Pay Later: Advertisings Credit, and Consumer Durables in the 1920s. 10. 
Ibid. 25.
Mowry, George E. The Urban Nation: 1920- 1960.6-7.
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reached a peak of about $7 billion.’’68 The composition of total consumption expenditures 
also showed distinct changes between 1898 - 1916 and 1922 - 1929. Consumers were
not merely relying on wages and salaries to purchased goods and services from 
businesses in the 1920s; they were more heavily financing the purchase of durable goods, 
the growth sector of consumer expenditures, using credit.69 The availability and 
precipitously increasing use of consumer credit facilitated consumption activity, even 
though labor incomes were restrained. Data on the aggregate amount of consumer debt
and the amount of consumer debt as a percentage of income is presented in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that, in the 1920s, the total amount of outstanding consumer debt
increased and that debt as a percentage of income increased as well. From 1919 to 1929,
outstanding consumer debt in 1982 dollars increased by more than $15 million. Debt as a
percentage of income also increased; debt increased from 4.64% of income to 9.34% of
income from 1919 to 1929. Through the accelerator effect, the effects of increasing
consumption activity rippled across the economy, increasing output, and eventually
translating into increasing investment.
68 Ibid. 6-7.
Bemanke, similarly to Olney, notes the pervasive use of credit by “small borrowers, such as households 
and unincorporated businesses” as “greatly increase[ing] their debts” in the 19201s. Bemanke, Ben. 
"Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression." 261.
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TABLE 3
The Use of Consumer Debt
Outstanding 
Consumer Debt, 
Millions of 1982 $
Debt as a 
% of 
Income
TABLE 4
Average Shares of Total 
Consumer Expenditures, Current 
Price Estimates
1919 $ 8,860.00 4.64%
$ 9,510.001920 4.68%
$ 9,678.001921 5.49% Major Durable Goods
1922 $ 10,862.00 5.89% 1898-
$ 12,155.001923 5.63% 1916 4.0
$ 13,619.001924 5.95% 1922-
$ 15,633.001925 6.89% 1929 7.6
$ 18,069.001926 7.25% Source: O ney, Martha L. Buy 
Now, Pay Later: Advertising, 
Credit, and Consumer Durables 
in the 1920s.
$ 18,839.001927 7.54%
$ 21,043.001928 8.68%
$ 24,096.001929 9.34%
Source: Olney, Martha L. Buy Now, Pay 
Later: Advertising, Credit, and Consumer 
Durables in the 1920s.
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Part IV. The Effect of Changes in Factor Income Shares on Investment and
Consumption, in Theory
Profits and Wages Affect Investment and Consumption
Profits and wages, as remuneration to firms and laborers, respectively finance 
investment and consumption activity. While expectations are one element that influences 
investment and consumption, profits and wages, to a large extent, finance economic
actors’ investment and consumption. Keynes states that “the considerations upon which
expectations of prospective yields [on investment] are based are partly existing facts 
which we can assume to be known more or less for certain, and partly future events 
which can only be forecasted with more or less confidence.’’70 The former refers to a
calculated yield on a particular investment opportunity whereas the latter refers to the
expectations of future demand fora firm’s output. In terms of consumption, Keynes
argues that ‘"the amount that the community spends on consumption obviously depends
(i) partly on the amount of its income, (ii) partly on the other objective attendant
circumstances, and (iii) partly on the subjective needs and the psychological propensities
and habits of the individuals composing it and the principles on which the income is 
divided between them (which may suffer modification as output is increased).”71 The
microeconomic changes in the behavior of consumers and producers, in response to
changes in profits and labor incomes in the aggregate, significantly influenced the macro­
economy.
70 Keynes, John M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. 147. 
Ibid. 90-91.71
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Part V. The Effect of Shifts in Factor Income Shares on Investment and
Consumption, in the 1920s
The low degree of competition, proliferation of advertising，suppressed level of 
union membership, vast gains in productivity, and urbanization all contributed to firms’ 
increased profits and the stifling of labor income growth. The relative increase in the ratio 
of profits to wages and salaries enlarged the income disparity between firms and laborers. 
The growing factor income inequality converted the microeconomic changes into 
macroeconomic disruptions. Changes in business investment stem from two
preconditions: firms must have both incentives, and the ability to invest before the
economy experiences significant investment activity. The former refers to a firm’s
expected realization of money returns from an investment while the latter relates to credit
conditions and retained profits. Increasing profits and access to credit provided firms with
the ability to aggressively pursue investment opportunities while expectations of future
demand for output created incentives for surging investment. Even though consumption
increased throughout the 1920s, the rate of consumption lagged behind the rate of 
investment. Overinvestment in manufacturing, facilitated by profit-biased economic
expansion，stimulated unsustainable, investment-led, economic growth. “[A] process of
over-investment relative to consumption occurred, in which accumulation surged forward
despite... slowing consumer demand. This meant that as the 1920s progressed, the U.S. 
economy... became increasingly fragile and prone to ruin.”73 In the next section I will 
discuss the methodology behind my empirical analysis. I will also show the empirical
72 Keller uses a C/I ratio (consumption/investment) to show that investment increased more than 
consumption from 1919 to 1929. The C/I ratio stands at 6.41 in 1919, but in 1929 it is 5.43. Keller, Robert 
R. “Monopoly Capital and the Great Depression: Testing Baran and Sweezy’s Hypothesis.”
Devine, James. “The Causes of the 1929-33 Great Collapse: A Marxian Interpretation** in Paul 
Zarembaka (ed). 120.
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relationship between labor incomes and consumption, and between retained income and 
investment.
Correlating P/Y = I/Y and LI/Y = C/Y
Pearson correlations, used to examine the relationship between factor income 
inequality and consumption and investment variables, afford insight into ascertaining the 
effects of income distribution on the macro-economy. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient, r, measures the degree of correlation between a variable, x，and a variable, y. 
The Pearson r is equal to E(x - ^)(y - y)] /E(^- ^)2S(y—y) 2]1/2 . The results of this
test show the level of correlation between changes in x to changes in y. The rate of 
increase or decrease in profits (兀）is correlated to changes in investment activity by 
correlating real profits with real investment. Profits share, measured by dividing profit by
output (Y)，is also used to examine the relationship between profits and investment. The
share of investment (I), or capital formation，is computed by dividing I by output ⑺•
Two different sets of relationships are used to investigate correlations between profits and
investment. Real shares are correlated to determine how movements in the proportion of
profits to national income relate to changes in the proportion of investment to national
income. The share of labor incomes to national income is measured by the total wages
and salaries (LI) divided by output (Y). Consumption (C) is evaluated on an analogous
basis; consumption’s share of national output is calculated by dividing consumption by
national output, n /Y, I/Y, LI/Y, and C/Y are profit’s share, investment’s share, labor
income’s share, and consumption’s share, respectively. In any given Pearson correlation,
the variable, x, is equal to n9 n /Y, LI, or LI/Y; conversely, the other variable, y, is equal
to I，I/Y, C, or C/Y. In the manufacturing sector, each variable is denoted with a subscript
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(m). For example, the profit in manufacturing is symbolized by 7cm. Pearson correlations
are used to correlate real shares and real variables.
In order to obtain the most precise relationship between profits and investment, I 
need to provide 汪 brief analysis of the measurement of profits. Since a primary goal of 
this paper is to determine the degree to which profits are correlated with investment，a
proper measurement of profits is necessary. Factor profits, as defined by economists 
looking at factor incomes, are equal to dividends and interest payments. This
measurement however, would inaccurately capture movements in investment activity.
Intuitively, dividends and interest payments are not utilized by capital owners to engage 
in capital accumulation. Dividends paid to shareholders are a form of household income
and interest payments represent a form of income to financial intermediaries.
Expenditures from households are reflected in consumption, notin investment. Interest
payments to financial intermediaries do not directly contribute to capital expenditures.
Contention for the use of traditional measure of factor profits is expressed because the
traditional measure of factor profits encompasses returns to individuals. The use of the
traditional notion factor profits is therefore inappropriate for the following analyses
because investment decisions reflect returns to firms rather than individuals. A
correlation between profits and investment therefore needs to encompass returns to firms,
not returns to individuals, because the expected profit of firms ultimately persuade firms
to invest. Profit not only influences expectations, but profit also finances investment
activity. Firms finance investment through retained profits and depreciation allowances,
not dividends and interest payments. A gross profit measurement, as calculated by
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retained income, or the value of output less the cost of materials and cost of labor, 
accurately represents a firm’s ability to engage in investment.
The relationship between labor income and consumption is more straightforward. 
The fundamental means of consumption activity arises from labor income, both wages 
and salaries. In this study, I calculated labor income by adding income in the form of 
wages and salaries, or by extracting the cost of labor from firms.
The Results of the Pearson Correlations
more
74
)
Manufacturing
The data from manufacturing was obtained from the Sixteenth Census of
Manufactures. Because the census is only conducted every two years, only alternate years
were provided for the 1919 - 1939 time period. Pearson correlations were calculated
from 1919 to 1929 to capture the relationship between changes in real profits and changes
in real investment during an expansion phase of the business cycle in the manufacturing
sector. Table 5 presents the real distribution ratio, profits to LI, increased therefore
suggesting that profits increased at a greater rate than labor incomes during the 1920s. 
The 7cm29/LIm29 ratio increased from 0.637 to 1.142 by the end of 1929. This result is 
more clearly seen by looking at the changes in individual components. Profit’s real share 
of the real value of total output in the manufacturing sector increased during the 1920s
with labor’s real share remaining relatively constant.
74 This gross profit measurement is used in the manufacturing sector due to the severe limitations of the 
available data for the pre-Great Depression time period. A more accurate measure would account for 
depreciation, interest, rents, taxes, and other miscellaneous expenses by additionally subtracting these 
from the gross profit figure.
costs
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TABLE 5
Income Distribution in the Manufacturing Sector 1919 一 1929, Deflated for 1929 
___  Dollars75
7Cm29/LIm29 7C/LI 兀 m29/Ym29 LIm29/Ym29
1919 0.637396492 0.918150192 0.135267815 0.212219265
1921 0.764316949 0.747966252 0.180854504 0.236622391
1923 0.839298603 0.890475347 0.187481395 0.223378658)
1925 0.952599579 1.015962387 0.198295924 0.208162935) 1927 1.023679019 1.006029381 0.220028901 0.214939348
1929 1.141615168 1.141615168 0.239832091 0.210081381
Source: Sixteenth Census of the United States: Manufactures.____________
Table 6 presents two columns of Pearson correlations for the data in the
manufacturing sector. The reason that the Pearson correlations were broken up into these
time series is to make the Pearson correlations in the manufacturing sector comparable
with Pearson correlations using national data. As Table 6 shows, the Pearson correlations 
for real shares of profits and real shares of investment are highly correlated in the 
manufacturing sector in both time periods. From 1919 - 1929, there is .8936 correlation 
whereas from 1923 to 1929 the variables are .9536 correlated. Real profits and real
investment are even more highly correlated at .9568 from 1919 to 1929 and .9781
correlated from 1923 to 1929.
TABLE 6
Pearson Correlation for the Manufacturing 
Sector 1919 - 1929, Deflated for 1929 Dollars
1923 - 19291919-1929
n 0129/Ym29 
Im29/Ym29 .9536•8936
•9781•9568Im29?tm29
Source: Calcu ated by the author using data
from Sixteenth Census of the United States: 
Manufactures.______________________
75 Profit、share plus labor’s share does not add up to 100% because Ym is the value of products in the 
manufacturing industry, not total income in manufacturing. It also does not add up to 100% because taxes 
are paid on profits of corporations.
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76National (NBER, Dumenil, Kreps-Keller)
Three data sets were used to correlate national variables because each set of data
utilizes 汪 different measure of profits and to add robustness to my results. Data were 
obtained from the NBER, Dumenil, and Kreps-Keller. Data gathered from these three 
sources are used to correlate profit’s real share of national income with investment’s real 
share of national income as well as labor、real share of national income with
consumptions share of national income. Also, real profits and real labor incomes are
correlated with real investment and real consumption, respectively. Using Pearson 
correlations, these calculations provide information regarding the relationship between
two variables. The most complete national data set, NBER data, began in 1923 and ended
in 1939; therefore, the series of data was segmented into two groups. Data from 1923 to
1929 affords insight into the correlation between two variables during the 1920’s growth
period, whereas data from 1929 to 1933 offers the degree of relatedness between the
variables during the Great Depression. Dumenil’s series begins in 1919, but ends in 1929;
therefore, only a single time period was run using Dumenil’s data. Kreps-Keller’s data
was by far the most incomplete; their data set begins in 1922 and ends in 1929.
The first data set, from the NBER, is shown in Table 7. Real data is provided for
GNP, consumer outlays, and gross capital formation deflated for 1929 dollars, but data
for labor incomes and profits are presented in nominal terms; therefore, labor incomes
and profits were adjusted for constant 1929 dollars.
Income distribution, using NBER data, is measured in nominal terms, real terms,
and real shares. The nominal income distribution, as measured by the nominal ratio of
76 Due to the limitations of data from the pre-Great Depression time period, Dumenil calculated profits by 
subtracting labor incomes from total income. In my analysis of the manufacturing sector, I also calculated 
profits in a similar fashion.
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profits to labor incomes, showed an increase from 0.023 in 1923 to 0.029 in 1929. The 
26% increase in nominal income distribution suggests profits were increasing at a greater 
rate than labor incomes. Looking at the deflated figures, the ratio of real profits to real 
labor incomes followed the same pattern. The ratio of real profits to real labor incomes 
increased from 0.022 to 0.029 from 1923 to 1929. Furthermore, the share of real profit to 
real GNP increased from 1.20% to 1.54% from 1923 to 1929. The share of real labor
income to real GNP declined from 54.95% in 1923 to 53.76% in 1929. These statistics
show that factor income inequality increased throughout the 1920s.
TABLE 7
NBER Income Distribution from 1923 to 1929, Deflated for 1929 Dollars (in Billions)
GNP L29 / 兀29/ 兀/LI,
Nominal(Y29) LI29 Y29 Y29 7C29/LI29兀29
1923 78.8 43.3 54.95% 0.943 1.20% 0.023 0.022
1924 80.3 43.3 53.92% 0.388 0.48% 0.009 0.009
82.91925 43.97 53.04% 0.733 0.88% 0.018 0.017
1926 88.5 46.37 52.40% 2.180 2.46% 0.048 0.047
1927 89.5 47.56 53.14% 0.6 0.67% 0.012 0.013
1928 90.6 49.4 54.53% 0.884 0.98% 0.018 0.018
1929 97.1 52.2 53.76% 1.5 1.54% 0.029 0.029
Source: Bums, Arthur F. Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research
Table 8 shows the results of the Pearson correlations using 1929 as the base year.
The Pearson correlations, correlating real shares of labor incomes to real consumption
shares, and real shares of profits to real investment shares, produced positive
relationships. The correlation between real shares of labor incomes to real consumption
shares, from 1923 to 1929, was .1903 correlated. The real shares of profit incomes to real
investment shares, from 1923 to 1929, were more strongly correlated, at .5346. Overall
however, the correlations between the real values were much more highly correlated than
the real share correlations. In the same time period, the Pearson correlation yielded a
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•9596 correlation between real labor incomes and consumption, as well as a .6503 
correlation between real profits and real investment.
TABLE 8
NBER Pearson Correlations, using deflated 
____  929 Dollars
1923-1929
LI29/Y29: 
C29/Y29 .1903
Ll29 = C29 •9596
冗29/Y29:
I29/Y29 •5346
7C29 = 129 •6503
Source: Calculated by the author from Bums, 
Arthur F. Twenty-Sixth Annual Report 
of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research New York: National Bureau 
of Economic Research, Inc., 1946. 30 
-33.
One possible interpretation of the vast increase in the results of the Pearson
correlations from real shares to real variables stems from ability, incentive, and
expectations. Setting credit aside for the moment, consumption expenditures in the 1920s
were primarily financed by labor incomes. Intuitively, as labor incomes rise, then the
ability of individuals and households to consume will increase as well. Changes in the
real value of labor incomes are likely to produce changes in the real value of
consumption expenditures regardless of whether or not labor income’s share of GNP
increased or decreased. Consumers and investors can’t base their decisions on their
respective shares of GNP because this information is unknowable until the year is over.
Instead, consumers and investors base their decisions on the amount of income they
receive and the amount of profit generated, respectively.
Huey 42
The use of credit by firms to purchase producer durables and the use of credit by 
individuals to purchase consumer durables provides a feasible explanation for the results 
of the Pearson correlations. As argued in a preceding component of this paper, consumer 
credit played an important role in the purchase of durable goods in the 1920s. Changes in 
real labor incomes alone, therefore, may not necessarily account for all of the change in
consumption expenditures. The increasing significance of durable goods expenditures as
a component of total consumer expenditures from previous decades suggests that credit,
in conjunction with labor incomes, financed consumption activity.
Even though the role of credit in financing investment expenditures is not the
main focus of my thesis, credit is used by firms to finance investment. While profit
provides the ability, incentive, and expectation for firms to invest, profits are often
supplemented with credit to finance investment due to the large capital requirements
necessary to purchase new property, plant, and equipment.
Dumenil’s data series, the second data set, includes total income, compensation,
profit, and the total capital stock from 1919 to 1929 in Table 9. The scope of his data 
however, is more limited than the data provided by the NBER. The fundamental flaw
with Dumenil’s data concerns his calculation of profits. Dumenil constructs his profit
figures by subtracting compensation from total rather than separately obtaining a profit 
figure from corporations. The method he utilizes for estimating profits is highly 
inaccurate and imprecise. The NBER’s, in comparison to Dumenil’s，estimate of profit is 
not merely the residual of total income less wages and salaries. The NBER’s profit figure 
is obtained from corporations as equal to the income retained in addition to dividend
payments.
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According to Dumenil, the ratio of profits to compensation throughout the 1920s 
did not increase. Both the nominal and real profit to compensation ratio increased from 
1922 to 1928: the nominal ratio increased from 0.427 to 0.445 while the real ratio
increased from 0.412 to 0.437. Furthermore, labor’s real share of total income marginally 
decreased from 0.6927 in 1922 to 0.6898 in 1929. DumeniPs income distribution data, as
shown in Table 8, reflect the cyclical nature of the economy; therefore, it is inappropriate
to compare data from 1919 to 1929. The data for 1919 reflects the height of an economic
upturn. Moreover, the figures for the 1929 series maybe depressed due to the economic
recession that started at the end of 1929.
TABLE 9
Dumenil Income Distribution 1919 - 1929
^29 /
Y29
兀29 /LI29
1929= 100
LI29/Y29
1929=100
1929
100n /LI
0.2762730.438213048 0.6304532451919 0.631232521
0.336495608 0.69992733 0.2355221920 0.46664144
0.301043795 0.307624675 0.767452468 0.2360871921
0.2856150.427320955 0.412282346 0.69276541922
0.43299673 0.685213585 0.2966950.459398971923
0.2960740.426067953 0.6948991070.4390578291924
0.667490089 0.3063250.489446164 0.4589207391925
0.429936009 0.687213089 0.2954580.4381561581926
0.296160.424808804 0.6971603930.4174845151927
0.301490.445048106 0.43705323 0.6898233421928
0.2907750.409990628 0.7092245720.4099906281929
Source: Dumenil, Gerard, Mark Glick，and Jose Rangel. “Theories 
of the Great Depression: Why Did Profitability Matter?” 
_____ Review of Radical Political Economics 19 (1987): 16 - 42.
Pearson correlations using Dumenil’s data were unrewarding. Due to the
limitations of Dumenil’s data set, investment was calculated by taking the difference in
capital stock from year to year. As Dumenil failed to provide consumption expenditures, 
this data series was taken from Lebergott. While the inconsistency of the data provided
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by Dumenil already contributes to the questionable nature of the Pearson correlations, his
calculation of profits as well as my own calculation of a constant deflator may have
biased the results.
As previously argued, DumeniPs calculation of profits inappropriately measure
factor income distribution; his calculation of profits similarly distorts the Pearson
correlations. Profits are not equal to total income less labor incomes; therefore, the
relationship between real profits and real investment, and the degree of relatedness
between real profit’s share and real investment’s share is not highly correlated.
My construction of a 1929 deflator to convert the nominal figures provided by
Dumenil into real figures may potentially have further biased the results of the Pearson
correlations. The .7601 correlation between labor’s share and consumption’s share, as
well as the .9909 correlation between real labor incomes and real consumption from
Dumenil’s data are higher than comparable correlations using data from the NBER. I
deflated Dumeml’s nominal figures into 1929 dollars by using a Consumer Price Index
(CPI) deflated for 1982 - 1984 dollars, a Wholesaler Price Index (WPI) deflated for 1982 
dollars, and a GDP Price Deflator Index deflated for 1996 dollars. Using this data, I then
constructed my own price indices based on 1929 dollars; I divided the index value for 
each year by the 1929 value for each indices. I subsequently used this 1929 base year 
price index to deflate Dumenil，s nominal data. This may have potentially increased the 
relatedness between the labor income and consumption variables because both variables
converted from nominal to real figures using the same constructed price indexwere
figure.
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TABLE 10
Dumenil Pearson Correlations, Real 
Shares
1923-1919-
19291929
LI29/Y29
C29/Y29 •7601■4514
LI29 = C29 •9657 •9909
兀29/Y29 
I29/Y29 •6345 •1494
兀29 = b9 •5557 -.4324
Source: Dumenil, Gerard, Mark Glick, 
and Jose Rangel. “Theories of the 
Great Depression: Why Did 
Profitability Matter?” Review of 
Radical Political Economics 19 
(1987): 16-42._____________
The third data set was provided by T.J. Kreps and Robert Keller. Neither T.J.
Kreps, nor Robert Keller provided a complete data series; however, a combination of
both data series provided sufficient data to run Pearson correlations. Kreps’ article
contained data on LI, dividends and interest, and national income. Keller’s article had
both consumption and investment data. Rather than profits，dividends and interest are
used in this series to demonstrate the problems with correlating dividends and interest
with investment. The data set shows that both labor’s share of national income and
dividend and interest’s share of income increased; however, looking at the ratio of
dividends and interest to labor income, it is clear that dividends and interest increased at a
greater rate than labor income.
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TABLE 11
Kreps-Keller Income Distribution 1923 - 1929
Div & Int29 / Div & Int29 /
LI29/Y29Div&Int/LI Y29li29
1923 0.163640023 0.6178588920.173618073 0.101106443
1924 0.1697728660.174948868 0.617383823 0.104815021
1925 0.187941522 0.176220121 0.607036909 0.106972117
1926 0.197941526 0.617864511 0.1223010440.201726064
0.6153166371927 0.220988982 0.1359781970.217178827
1928 0.620536441 0.1403170820.230258609 0.226122227
0.1583389961929 0.248940956 0.6360504070.248940956
Source: Constructed using data from Kreps, T.J. “Dividends, interest, Profits, 
Wages, 1923-35八 1.”___________________________________________
The results of my test of the relationship between these variables are seen in Table
12. The share of labor’s income to the share of consumption was .7599 correlated
whereas the share of dividends and interest to the share of investment was .0007
correlated. The correlation between the share of dividends and interest to the share of
investment is low because dividends are disbursed to shareholders, not retained by firms.
As disbursement to shareholders, this represents a negative change in the amount of funds
available for firms to use to finance investment. Furthermore, interest paid to debt
holders, such as banks, do not lead to macroeconomic forms of investment. In the 
macroeconomic sense, investment refers to expenditures for property, plant, and 
equipment, as well as changes in inventories. Debt holders do not directly contribute to 
any of these activities. The outcomes of the Pearson correlations for this set of data, 
similar to the results of the Pearson correlations using Dumenil’s data is subject to higher
correlations due to deflator commonality.
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TABLE 12
Kreps-Keller Pearson Correlations 1923 - 1929, 
1929=100
1923 -1929
L29/Y29 = C29/Y29 •7599
LI29 = C29 •9742
Div& Int29/Y29 = 
I29/Y29________ •007
Div & Int29 - 129 •8133
Source: Calculated using data from Keller, Robert 
R. “Monopoly Capital and the Great 
Depression: Testing Baran and Sweezy’s 
Hypothesis.” and Kreps, T.J. “Dividends, 
_____ interest, Profits，Wages，1923-35A1.>,
Adverse Effects of Factor Income Inequality and the Declining Availability of 
Credit in the 1930s
Firms, aspiring to acquire an appreciating share of profit, stimulated investment
activity to ultimately expand their productive capacity. The expanding productive
capacity of firms catalyzed accumulation in the 1920s. By the end of the 1920s however,
an abundance of capital accumulation turned into over-accumulation as under­
consumption depressed consumption expenditures and subsequently caused a decline in
capacity utilization. Over-accumulation over-expanded the aggregate productive capacity 
of firms. As long as sufficient demand for output existed to require firms to utilize their
productive capacity, the economy could continue to operate; however, the onset of a 
cyclical downturn, signified by decreasing demand, could or would limit firms from fully 
utilizing their bolstered productive capacity and therefore diminish their incentive to 
engage in new investment activity. “[T]his type of [investment-led] growth creates 
imbalances that can block recovery: the production capacity created so abundantly during
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the boom is a factor discouraging the rebound of investment once crisis occurs.’’77 Over­
accumulation, facilitated by the exorbitant level of factor income inequality, amplified a
cyclical downturn into a depression. Devine asserts that over-accumulation existed
because there was a rise in the potential profit rate from unequally-distributed growth in 
the 1920s; he described this concept as investment during the end of the 1920s as “over-
78shooting” the level of consumption.
Growing factor income inequality, favoring the profits of firms, altered the
composition of national expenditures in the 1920s. Asa measure of the composition of
consumption and investment expenditures, Keller calculates the ratio of nominal
consumption to investment. The C/I ratio decreases from 1919 to 1929 by 1.98,
79suggesting that investment expenditures increased throughout this time period.
over-investment process is akin to a “bubble” in financial markets: the economy is
growing because of faith that the economy will continue to grow, while profitability is 
maintained because high profit rates encourage investment.” The microeconomic
changes in the income distribution, reflecting shifting proportions favoring firm over
labor remuneration stimulated short-term economic growth, but retarded long-term
economic prosperity.
During the recession, factor income inequality, the contraction of credit, and over-
accumulation converted a cyclical downturn into a depression. The high level of factor
income inequality by 1929 manifested itself into under-consumption. Over-accumulation,
77 Devine, James. “The Causes of the 1929-33 Great Collapse: A Marxian Interpretation” in Paul 
Zarembaka (ed). 162.
Devine, James. “The Causes of the 1929-33 Great Collapse: A Marxian Interpretation” in Paul 
Zarembaka (ed). 158, 160.
Keller, Robert R. “Monopoly Capital and the Great Depression: Testing Baran and Sweezy*s 
Hypothesis.** 72.
80 Devine, James. “The Causes of the 1929-33 Great Collapse: A Marxian Interpretation” in Paul 
Zarembaka (ed). 160.
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only externalizing itself after demand initially decreased, exaggerated the degree of 
unused capacity ordinarily associated with a reduction in demand. Furthermore, the 
tightening of credit served to inhibit the ability of firms and consumers to supplement 
their income-spending with credit.
Under-consumption, arising from the high level of factor income inequality and 
credit rationing, contributed to decreasing consumption expenditures, thereby decreasing 
the level of output from firms, ultimately leading to a decreasing profit rate on aggregate 
output. As labor incomes, as well as credit, finance the consumption activity of workers, 
the relative constriction of wages, salaries，and the availability of credit beginning in the 
1930s prevented consumer demand of output from rising to meet the available productive 
capacity of firms thereby diminishing future returns on investment and eradicating
expectations of future demand. “[T]he relatively small incomes of the majority of the 
population limits their ability to consume the output that the economy is increasingly 
capable of producing.” The substitution of capital for labor inputs in the 1920s yielded
short-term profits for firms; however, increasing profits due to declining labor costs was
unsustainable in the long-run because it led to under-consumption. “With the substitution
of machines for unskilled labor throughout the 1920s，moreover, the wages of unskilled 
workers fell 8 percent... [and] 3 percent for unskilled workers by 1929.”82 By reducing
the employment of laborers, the firm benefits from decreases in the aggregate wage bill,
but also simultaneously reduces its consumer base. Limiting the purchasing power of
consumers through depressing wages and salaries inhibited the demand for firm output
and therefore decreased long-term profits. Table 13 shows that there was a decrease in
SI Alcaly，Roger E. “An Introduction to Marxian Crisis Theory.” 18.
Oshima, Harry T. "The Growth of U.S. Factor Productivity: The Significance of New Technologies in 
the Early Decades of the Twentieth Century." 164.
82
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real consumer outlays from $76.4 billion in 1929 to $61.2 billion in 1932. Real retained 
incomes for the national economy also declined; it decreased from $1.5 billion to -$7.03
billion between 1929 and 1932.
TABLE 13
Income Retained and Consumer Outlays, in 1929 Dollars (in 
__  Billions) 
Real Retained Income Consumer Outlay
1923 0.9425 61.9
1924 0.3882 66
1925 0.7329 64.9
1926 2.1803 70
1927 0.6 71.7
1928 0.8838 73.2
1929 1.5 76.4
1930 -0.7705 75.7
1931 -4.0672 68.6
1932 61.2-7.0286
1933 61.5-5.7544
1934 67.2-4.1953
1935 67.3-2.4956
1936 73.5-0.8259
1937 79-1.5409
1938 79.7-0.8441
1939 85.10.7398
Source: Constructed by the author from Bums, Arthur F. 
Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. New York: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Inc., 1946. 30 - 33._________________________
Under-consumption not only reduced profits, but also further exacerbated
economic degeneration by producing pessimistic expectations. Amoskeag Manufacturing
Co., a textile manufacturer, reported a loss of $1,200,000 in 1932. While lower than its
losses in 1930 of $1,345,389 billion, their losses increased from 1931 to 1932 by over
$400,000. The general attitude towards future economic conditions was described as
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”83drab. During the beginning of 1932, Col. Leonard P. Ayres, an economist speaking to 
the American Economic Association and American Statistical Association, noted that 
“the decline has not yet ended.，，84 “During the late spring the general opinion was that
operation of the steel industry, and of the U.S. Steel Corp. would reach the low of the 
year during July. Recently, because of the lack of improvement in buying, this view has 
been changed, and many now believe that the bottom will not be reached until the late 
months of the year.”85 With headlines such as <fiNo More Dreaming，，，“Armour’s Earnings 
Poorest since 1922,55 and “Looks for Slow Recovery,55 the business sentiment towards the 
condition of the economy throughout the early 1930s was dismal. The depressing 
consequences of under-consumption on consumption expenditures and expectations were
intensified by its effect on firms’ profits and therefore capacity utilization.
During the recession, the confluence of under-consumption, the reduction in the
availability of credit, and over-accumulation manifested itself in the form of unused
productive capacity and therefore prevented an investment-led economic resuscitation.
Over-accumulation had real impacts on both a firm’s return on new investment and
employment.
Investment, the catalyst of economic growth throughout the 1920s, over-expanded
firms’ productive capacity leading to negligible yields on new investment. Increasing
realized profits and expectations of future profits mutually reinforced capital
accumulation, thereby increasing productive capacity during the 1920s. When the
83 iiTextile Losses Grow: Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. Deficit Last Year Estimated at $1,200,000, against 
$782,667 Loss in 1931." Barrons, 20 February 1933, sec. 13, p. 13. http://www.proquest.cora (29 March 
2009).
“Five Prerequisites of Recovery: Business Depression Not Yet Over - Comparison with Past 
Depressions.” Barrons, 4 January 1932, sec. 12, p. 14. http://www.proquest.com (29 march 2009).
85 “Steel Operations at Record Depression Lows.” Barrons, 14 September 1931, sec. 11, p. 23. 
http://www.proquest.com (29 March 2009).
84
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cyclical downturn occurred, however, the decreases in demand from consumers
exaggerated increases in unused capacity because of firms’ over-expanded productive 
capacity. In the iron and steel industry, the percentage of industrial output drops from 
producing at 100% of their total productive capacity in the second quarter of 1929 to only 
58.1% of their 1929 productive capacity in the fourth quarter. Output levels declined to 
16.1% in the second quarter of 1932 and fail to achieve output above pre-crash levels 
until the end of 1939. Output for the automobile and rubber products industry was 
curtailed significantly from the second to fourth quarter of 1929; automobile output 
declined to 29.5% and rubber output dropped to 47.3%.86 Waning demand from
consumers for goods and services arrested new investment throughout the 1930s. At one
point, in the steel industry, the level of total steel production dropped from 60% of total 
productive capacity to 55% in a matter of three weeks.87 “The fact that early 1937
production in the manufacturing industries was approaching 1929 levels while capital
outlays remained relatively low and much of the productive capacity of many industries
remained unused makes it doubtful whether capital outlays greater than those of recent
years can be expected in manufacturing industries before earlier production levels are 
exceeded.”88 Any new investment from firms would not have been met with adequate
levels of demand for firms to acquire profitable returns. According to the BEA, real
investment precipitously declined from 1929 to 1932. Real gross private domestic
investment decreased from $91.3 billion to $11.5 billion chained 2000 US dollars from
86 Bernstein, Michal A. The Great Depression: Delayed recovery and economic change in America, 1929- 
1939. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987.96-99.
"The Week Reviewed." Barrons, 20 October 1930, sec. 10, p. 4. http://www.proquest.com (29 March 
2009).
Weintraub, David. “Effects of Current and Prospective Technological Developments Upon Capital 
Formation.” The American Economic Review. Vol. 29, no. 1 (1939): 15-32.31.
87
88
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1929 to 1932. As empirical evidence was provided to correlate income distribution 
variables with their respective macroeconomic expenditures in the 1920s，狂 
corresponding analysis will be provided for the Great Depression.
Table 14 provides empirical evidence of the correlation between real shares of 
labor incomes, real shares of consumption, real labor incomes, real consumption, real 
profits, real investment, real shares of profits，and real shares of investment prior to the 
Great Depression, and during the Great Depression. Table 14 also shows that both
consumers and firms more accurately aligned their expenditures with their incomes and
profits, respectively.
TABLE 14
NBER Pearson Correlations, using deflated 1929 Dollars
1923 - 1929 1929-1933
LI29/Y29: 
C29/Y29 .9670• 1903
Ll29 = C29 .9596 •9840
兀29/Y29:
I29/Y29 .5346 •9831
•6503 .9852冗29 = ^29
Source: Calculated by the author from Bums, Arthur F. 
Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Inc., 1946. 30 - 33.___________
The stronger correlations during 1929 to 1933 compared to the correlations during
1923 to 1929 suggest that both firms and consumers more accurately aligned their
purchase of new investment and consumption expenditures according to changes in their
respective real counterparts. The higher Pearson correlations seen from 1929 -1933， 
compared to 1923 - 1929, can be potentially explained by a reduction in the availability 
of credit. Investment’s share is more likely to correlate with profit’s share if a firm’s
method of financing investment, access to credit, is restricted. If credit is unavailable,
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then firms are required to use their profits to finance their investment activity. Also, if 
profits are declining, then firms lack incentives to invest. This argument can be used 
analyze the correlation change between labor’s share and consumption’s share when
comparing 1923 -1929 with 1929 - 1933.
The restriction of credit extended to consumers can account for the dramatically 
increasing correlation between two variables. From the 1923 - 1929 time period to the 
1929 - 1933 time period, the correlation of real labor incomes to real consumption 
increased from .9596 to .9840. This implies that consumers, compared to the decade of 
the twenties, were more much reliant on their wages and salaries to consume. Consumer 
credit was more readily available to households during the economic expansion in the 
1920s compared to the early part of the 1930s. The total volume of dollars lent by 
commercial banks decreased from 63 million in 1929 to 43 million in 1934.89 The
volume of dollars lent by finance companies declined by 141 million by 1933 from 463 
million in 1929.90 From the first time period to the second, the Pearson correlation also
showed an increase in the relatedness of real profits and real investment. The correlation
between real profits and real investment increased to .9852 during the Great Depression
from .6503 during the 1920s. From the perspective of firms, a declining profit share
would not only discourage firms from investing, but also prevent firms from using
retained profits to invest in purchasing new property, plant, and equipment. The argument
for the restriction of credit can also be extended from consumers to firms as the
restriction of credit affected both households and firms alike.
89 Olney, Martha L. Buy Now, Pay Later: Advertising, Credit, and Consumer Durables in the 1920s. 108,
134.
90 Ibid. 108.
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The restriction of credit to consumers, through higher interest rates and the failure 
of financial intermediaries, compelled consumers to be more dependent on their wages 
and salaries as the primary means to finance consumption expenditures. “The realized 
real interest rates... show that real rates were very high in 1931 and 1932.’’91 Table 15 
shows that the real interest rate was 12.62% in 1932. Even though the nominal interest 
rate was low, at 2.75%, the high deflation rate of -9.87% magnified the nominal interest
rate. The high real interest rate in 1931 and 1932 increased the cost of obtaining loanable
funds from the Federal Reserve and therefore reduced the aggregate amount of loanable 
funds. Asa cost passed on to potential borrowers, the high interest rate precluded
investment activity. The ability to borrow from both firms and consumers alike was
circumscribed by the high interest rate. “Such high real interest rates are no doubt part of
the reason that fixed investment plummeted during this phase [1931 - 1932] of the Great
Depression.
Furthermore, ctthe banking problems of 1930-33 disrupted the credit allocation
»93 Bemanke, in ‘*Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagationprocess.
of the Great Depression, cites bank runs and bank failures as primary causes for the
higher costs of credit intermediation and therefore the contraction of credit to consumers
and businesses. As the number of banks declined due to bank runs and as the cost of
obtaining reliable information regarding the credit worthiness of a borrower increased,
the cost of acting as an intermediary between potential net lenders and potential net
borrowers increased. These costs were transferred onto potential borrowers by increasing
91 Romer, Christina. “The Nation in Depression.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 2 (1993): 19-39.
32.
92 Ibid. 32.
Bemanke, Ben. "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great 
Depression." 264.
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bank reserves thereby reducing the availability of credit throughout the system. 
According to an NICB survey, in 1932,41.3% of very small firms (capitalization less
than $50,000), 22.2% of small firms ($50,001 - $500,000), 12.5 percent of medium firms 
($500,001-$1,000,000), and 9.7% of large companies (capital over $1 million) in the
manufacturing sector reported problems with accessing credit from banks.94 Under­
consumption, resulting from both the high level of factor income inequality and the 
contraction of credit, precluded firms from expecting increasing demand activity thereby
compounding the detrimental effects of over-accumulation.
Ibid. 273.
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TABLE 15
Interest Rates and Inflation from 1919 to 1939
Nominal Interest Rate 
(Discount Rate)
Real Interest 
Rate**Inflation*
1919 4.13%
1920 6.58% 15.61% -9.03%
1921 5.88% -10.50% 16.38%
1922 4.21% -6.15% 10.36%
1923 4.46% 1.79% 2.67%
1924 3.67% 0.00% 3.67%
1925 3.46% 2.34% 1.12%
1926 3.83% 1.14% 2.69%
1927 3.79% -1.69% 5.48%
1928 4.54% -1.72% 6.26%
1929 5.17% 0.00% 5.17%
1930 2.96% -2.34% 5.30%
1931 2.17% -8.98% 11.15%
1932 2.75% -9.87% 12.62%
1933 2.50% -5.11% 7.61%
1934 1.54% 3.08% -1.54%
1935 -0.74%1.50% 2.24%
1936 1.50% 1.46% 0.04%
1.29% 3.60% -2.31%1937
3.08%1938 1.00% -2.08%
2.42%1939 1.00% -1.42%
♦The inflation rate is calculated by the following formula: [(CPI 
一 CPI)/CPI]*100 = Inflation Rate
Real Interest Rate = Nominal Interest Rate-Inflation Rate 
Source: Wheelock, David C. “Federal Reserve Monetary Policy 
-Interest Rates: 1914 - 1999•” Vol. 3. In Historical Statistics of 
the United States，Richard Sutch and Susan B. Carter, 3-624. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006._____________
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Part VI. Summary and Conclusions
My hypothesis is that changes in the factor share ratio during the 1920s 
contributed to the severity and prolonged duration of the Great Depression. Authors such 
as Robert Keller, James Devine, and George Soule argue that factor income inequality 
played an important role in affecting the Great Depression; however, they fail to provide 
sufficient empirical analysis of its significance. Due to the limited amount of data 
available from the time period, rather than regressions, the preferred method of empirical 
analysis, Pearson correlations were used to correlate real wages and salaries with real 
consumption and real profits with real investment. Four different data sets, obtained from 
the Census of Manufacture, the NBER, Dumenil, and Kreps-Keller, are used to analyze 
correlations between the changing income distribution and the shifting composition of the
output.macroeconomic
My initial step in showing that income distribution affected the nature of the
Great Depression was to first prove that factor income shares changed during the 1920s.
Six factors, increasing market power, the use of advertising, a reduction in union power,
the proliferation labor-saving technology, and urbanization all contributed to increasing
profits over wages throughout the 1920s. After discussing the reasons for and providing
evidence of the growing level of factor income inequality, the macroeconomic
consequences of the shifting composition of national income were explained.
Increasing firm profits over consumer wages and salaries led to a higher increase
in the rate of investment than the rate of consumption expenditures. As retained profits
are used to finance investment, Pearson correlations were used to show that changes in
the level of profit correlated with changes in the level of investment in both the
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manufacturing sector and national economy. Profit-investment correlations 
performed for the manufacturing sector due to the economic importance of this sector. 
For the national economy, labor incomes, used to purchase consumer expenditures, were 
correlated with the level of consumption expenditures.
In the manufacturing sector, the level of factor income inequality increased and 
the changes in profits were highly correlated with changes in the degree of investment. 
From the data provided by the NBER, in the national economy, labor incomes were 
shown to be correlated with consumption expenditures and profits were correlated with 
investment.
were
On the national level, the NBER data is shown to be more accurate than data
provided by Dumenil or Kreps-Keller. Dumenil’s data for income distribution and the
Pearson correlations were biased because of the manner in which profits were calculated.
The Pearson correlations for Dumenil’s data were potentially further skewed by the
method I used to created a 1929 base year. The Pearson correlations conducted using data
from Kreps-Keller is shown to be inappropriate due to the Kreps’ use of dividends and
interest as a measure of profit.
Even though the profit-investment and labor-income-consumption correlations
from the NBER yielded high results, credit was used as an explanatory element for the
higher correlations during the Great Depression as opposed to the correlations from 1923
一 1929. With the wide-spread introduction of consumer credit in the 1920s, both the
financing of investment and consumption expenditures were augmented by the use of
credit. The contraction of credit during the Great Depression accounts for the increasing
degree of relatedness from the pre-Great Depression to Great Depression time period.
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After perform Pearson correlations to establish the positive relationship between profit 
and investment, and the relationship between labor income and consumption 
expenditures, it was concluded that there were two main reasons for the high correlations: 
profits functioned as the financial conduit and incentive for investment.
Profit-biased factor income distribution both enabled and incentivized capital 
formation throughout the 1920s. Firms became more inclined to invest in increasing their 
productive capacity to meet increasing demands for output. Throughout the 1920s,
consumer demand, stemming from wages and salaries, was supplemented by
unprecedented degrees of consumer credit thereby bolstering demand for output.
Consumer credit was used to purchase durable goods, the growth sector of consumer
expenditures. The increasing demand for output compelled firms to continue to increase
their productive capacity to realize more profits. The profit-biased income distribution,
leading to investment-led economic growth throughout the 1920s, catalyzed
unsustainable economic growth.
Under-consumption, stemming from the high level of factor income inequality
transformed the capital accumulation of the 1920s into over-accumulation by 1929. The
cyclical economic recession that afflicted the US economy towards the end of 1929 
splintered the already unstable economic framework. Declining demand led to decreasing 
profits which in turn curtailed new investment. Over-accumulation contributed to 
prolonging the recession by over-expanding firms，productive capacities. With over- 
expanded productive capacities, deteriorating demand compelled firms to utilize their 
existing productive capacity. Furthermore, under-consumption, stemming from the high
factor income inequality ratio, was reinforced by the contraction of consumer credit.
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Declining firm’s expectations, their decreasing realization of profits, and the tightening of 
producer credit exacerbated both the deteriorated ability and the willingness of firms to 
invest in new property, plant, and equipment in the early 1930s.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Consumer Debt from 1900 to 1929
Appendix A:
Consumer Debt from 1900 to 1929
Outstanding Consumer Debt, Millions of 1982 $ Debt as a % of Income
1900 $ 7,564.00 4.46%
1901 $ 8,027.00 4.40%
1902 $ 8,442.00 4.73%
1903 $ 8,905.00 4.95%
1904 $ 9,565.00 5.13%
$1905 9,991.00 5.18%
1906 $ 10,362.00 5.00%
1907 $ 9,651.00 5.06%
$1908 9,183.00 5.60%
1909 $ 10,982.00 5.37%
1910 $ 10,737.00 5.74%
1911 $ 10,003.00 6.01%
1912 $ 9,537.00 5.91%
$1913 9,030.00 6.03%
$1914 9,749.00 6.91%
$1915 10,044.00 6.96%
$1916 10,799.00 6.22%
$ 10,254.001917 5.41%
$1918 9,834.00 4.24%
$1919 8,860.00 4.64%
$1920 9,510.00 4.68%
$ 9,678.00 5.49%1921
$ 10,862.00 5.89%1922
$ 12,155.00 5.63%1923
$ 13,619.00 5.95%1924
$ 6.89%15,633.001925
$ 18,069.00 7.25%1926
$ 18,839.00 7.54%1927
$ 21,043.00 8.68%1928
$ 24,096.00 9.34%1929
Source: Olney, Martha L. Buy Nowt Pay Later: Advertising, Credit, and 
Consumer Durables in the 1920s. Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1991.______________________________________
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